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RIGHT TO COMPENSATION OF DE JURE AND DE FACTO
OFFICERS OF MUNICIPALITIES
When an election result is upset by a court after the apparent
winner has served for several months, a troublesome situation arises.
Should the de jure officer,' i.e., the officer determined by the court to
have been the winner, be allowed to recover the salary for the period
during which he was excluded from office? If so, from whom should
he be allowed to recover-the governmental body, which will be pay-
ing the salary twice, or the de facto officer,2 i.e., the apparent winner,
who will then go uncompensated for the services he performed?
This problem arose in the recent Rhode Island case of La Belle
v. Hazard.3 In that case an election dispute concerning the office of
town surveyor arose between the incumbent, La Belle, and his op-
ponent, Monahan. Although the ballots cast at the polls showed that
La Belle had a slight majority, a dispute arose concerning absentee
ballots. The board of canvassers notified the town council that it could
not issue a certificate of election to either candidate. The town coun-
cil, acting pursuant to state law, appointed Monahan town surveyor.
La Belle refused to vacate the office until compelled to do so under
threat of arrest. He immediately instituted quo warranto proceedings
in the Rhode Island Supreme Court and was adjudged the winner.4
Meanwhile, La Belle had been kept out of office for approximately
four months during which time Monahan had performed the duties
of office and had received compensation therefor. La Belle demanded
that the town pay him the salary attached to the office for this period
of time and brought assumpsit upon the town's refusal. The trial
court awarded La Belle his salary for the four month period.
The Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, affirmed. While
recognizing that "cases in other jurisdictions appear to be in direct
conflict," 5 the court adopted the following rule:
"Where the governmental body is responsible for the situation
giving rise to the dispute to office, where it has notice that such
'A de jure officer is one who in all respects is legally appointed and qualified
to exercise the office, and consequently has full legal right and title to the office. A
de facto officer has only color of right or title to exercise the office. Brown v. An-
derson, 21o Ark. 97o, 198 S.W.2d 188 (1946); People v. Brautigan, 310 Ill. 472, 142
N.E. 208 (1923).
2Ibid.
316o A.2d 723 (R.I. i96o).
'Powers ex rel. La Belle v. Monahan, 85 R.I. 398, 132 A.2d 97 (1957).
'i6o A.2d at 724.
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dispute exists, and where the de jure officer in no way acqui-
esced in his removal from office, he is entitled to the salary of
the office regardless of whether a de facto officer has already
been paid by the governmental body."6
This language in effect defines the rule adopted in a minority of the
states.7 However, the court's requirement that the governmental body
be "responsible for the situation" and have "notice" that a dispute
exists constitutes a variation from the minority rule.8
A majority of the states that have considered the problem have held
that when the governmental body pays the de facto officer it is dis-
charged from liability to the de jure officer.9 These courts reason that
efficiency in government demands that officers be paid promptly;
therefore, the disbursing officer should be able to rely upon the de
facto officer's apparent title.10 Forcing the city to pay the de jure of-
ficer later would be forcing the city to make a double payment, and
would therefore be unreasonable." The position of the majority is
based upon the premise that the de jure officer has no property right
in the office and therefore compensation is dependent upon the per-
formance of the duties.'2
There is, also, a logical basis for the rule followed in a minority of
the jurisdictions. These states hold that the de jure officer who is not
barred by his own conduct through waiver or estoppel may recover
616o A.2d at 725.
'State ex rel. Worrel v. Carr, 129 Ind. 44, 28 N.E. 88 (1891); Ness v. City of Fargo,
64 N.D. 231, 251 N.W. 843 (1933); Board of County Comm'rs v. Litton, 315 P.2d
239 (Okla. 1957). For a collection of cases see Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1375, 1390 (1959);
Annot., 55 A.L.R. 997, 1004 (1928).
'The minority rule is generally stated as follows: "A de jure officer who is
wrongfully excluded from his office, upon his restoration, is entitled to recover the
salary incident to his office during the time that he was wrongfully excluded,
although during the time of such exclusion the office was occupied by a de facto
officer who performed the duties thereof and was paid the salary." Ness v. City of
Fargo, 64 N.D. 231, 251 N.W. 843, 844 (1933). However, the principles of waiver and
estoppel may be applied against a de jure officer when he acquiesces in his illegal
removal, as in the occupancy of his office by another. 251 N.W. at 845. This ex-
ception was also applied where the de jure officer was declared legally entitled to the
office, but subsequently failed to qualify, neglecting to give bond, so that the
governmental body had to appoint a de facto officer. Rasmussen v. Board of Comm'rs,
8 Wyo. 277, 56 Pac. 1o98 (1899).
"E.g., McKinley v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 268, 16 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938); Board
of Auditors v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176, 4 Am. Rep. 382, 385-88 (1870); Bowlin v. Frank-
lin County, 152 Miss. 534, 120 So. 453, 454 (1929). For a collection of cases see
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1375, 1378 (1959); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 9 9 (b) n.i (195o).
"0Bowlin v. Franklin County, 152 Miss. 534, 120 So. 453, 454 (1929)-
"City of Peru v. State ex rel. McGuire, 210 Ind. 668, 199 N.E. 151, 153 (1936).
'Board of Auditors v. Benoit, 2o Mich. 176, 4 Am. Rep. 382, 385-88 (1870);
Hild v. Polk County, 242 Iowa 1354,49 N.W.2d 2o6, 210-11 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
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his back salary from the municipality. i3 It is reasoned that right to
salary is incident to the legal title to office. 14 Furthermore, public
policy is opposed to the denial of salary to one entitled thereto, and
payment of the salary to one who is not entitled to it should not
operate to the detriment of the duly elected officer.15
The rule that denies compensation to the de jure officer is sub-
ject to several important exceptions. For example, when the munici-
pality has not paid the de facto officer, 16 or when the de facto officer
was clearly a usurper,17 the de jure officer may recover from the city.
Similarly, the de jure officer may recover if the city pays the de facto
officer after a judicial determination that the de jure officer was wrong-
fully removed or is otherwise entitled to hold the office.' 8 It has been
held that the de jure officer can recover if the de facto officer was not
employed specifically to fill the vacancy, but was only one of several
men employed to do the same type of work.19 And it is universally held
that if the city acted in bad faith the de jure officer may recover,
20
but the mere fact that litigation was in progress is not enough to con-
stitute bad faith.
21
The La Belle case presented a situation in which-the governmental
body acted in good faith and paid the de facto officer before final
judgment in the suit to contest the election. The court was in the
position where it had to choose between the two rules, and it chose
the minority rule. However, the court did not adopt the strict minority
rule which allows the de jure officer to recover from the governmental
body in every case of wrongful exclusion from office. Instead it modi-
fied the rule requiring governmental "notice" and "responsibility for
uSee notes i and 8 supra.
uNess v. City of Fargo, 64 N.D. 231, 251 NAV. 843 (1933).
1Ibid.
"6City of Tulsa v. Coker, 181 Okla. 291, 73 P.2d 443 (1937).
1'
7
,Morten v. City of Aurora, 96 Ind. App. 2o3, 182 N.E. 259 (1932); City of Ardmore
v. Sayre, 54 Okla. 779, 154 Pac. 356 (1915); Warden v. Bayfield County, 87 Wis. 181,
58 N.W. 248 (1894).
"2Corbett v. City of Chicago, 391 Ill. 96, 62 N.E.2d 693 (1945); Markus v. City
of Duluth, 138 Minn. 225, 164 N.V. 906 (1917); Fylpaa v. Brown County, 6 S.D. 634,
62 N.W. 962 (1895).
2"Talmadge v. Seymour, 167 Ga. 6oi, 146 S.E. 473 (1929); Talmadge v. Cordell,
167 Ga. 594, 146 S.E. 467 (1928); Olsen v. City of Superior, 240 Wis. io8, 2 N.V.2d
718 (ig94); Seifen v. City of Racine, 129 'Wis. 343, iog NAV. 72 (19o6).
"Irwin v. Jefferson County, 228 Ala. 6o9, 154 So. 589, 590 (1934); Talmadge v.
Cordell, 167 Ga. 594, 146 S.E. 467, 471 (1928); Mattox v. Board of Education, 148 Ga.
577, 97 S.E. 532, 533 (1918); Glenn v. Chambers, 242 Iowa 760, 48 N.W.2d 275, 280
(1951); Hefter v. Bradway, 115 N.J.L. 81, 178 At. 199, 200 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Seaman
v. Monmouth County, 15 N.J. Misc. 249, 191 Ad. 103, 105, (Sup. Ct. 1935).
22Smith v. Board of Education, 1i F.2d 573, 575 (6th Cir. 194o).
1961] CASE COMMENTS 137
the situation giving rise to the dispute to office" in order for the de
jure officer to recover. Although these two requirements are nearly al-
ways present in cases where the minority rule has been applied, 22 it
might be argued that the court intended to limit the minority rule,
contemplating a situation in which the de jure officer would be barred
from recovery. The affirmative argument for this proposition is that
the court did not simply recite the minority rule, but created its own
rule. The negative argument is that since the court recited the reasons
for the minority rule, it impliedly accepted its conclusion. In any
case the Rhode Island Supreme Court did allow itself some leeway for
future decisions in this area.
There is the alternative under either the majority rule or minority
rule that the de jure officer can recover from the de facto officer even
though the latter acted in good faith and under color of title.23 The
reason for the rule is the same as that given for the minority rule-
the right to salary is incident to the legal title to the office.24 Courts
have admitted that the rule is harsh, but have said that it is so firmly
entrenched in the law that only the legislature can change it.25
The rule is made more harsh by the fact that an uncompensated
de facto officer cannot compel payment from the governmental body.2 6
Thus the de facto officer who has discharged the duties of public
office becomes an orphan of the law. Under the majority rule, the de
jure officer fails in his action against the municipality, because it
has previously paid the de facto officer.27 He is then permitted to re-
cover from the de facto officer, who has received the salary, even
though he (the de jure officer) has not performed these duties. 28
Since the de facto officer, who has performed the duties, may not re-
cover from the municipality, 29 the court finds itself faced with the
dilemma of either forcing the municipality to pay twice, or denying
compensation to one who has worked for it.
--See note 7 supra.
Valker v. Hughes, 42 Del. 447, 36 A.2d 47, 49 (1944); Fleming v. Anderson,
187 Va. 788, 48 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1948) (dictum). For a collection of cases see Annot.,
151 A.L.R. 952, 96o (1944); 67 C.JS. Officers § oo n.3i (1950). Contra, Stuhr v.
Curran, 44 N.J.L. 181, 43 Am. Rep. 353 (1882).
2Walker v. Hughes, 42 Del. 447, 36 A.2d 47, 49 (1944).
-Coughlin v. McElroy, 74 Conn. 397, 50 At. 1025, 1o28 (02).
nGerson v. City of Philadelphia, 342 Pa. 552, 2o A.2d 283, 284-85 (194). For
a collection of cases see Annot., 151 A.L.R. 952, 954 (1944); Annot., 93 A.L.R. 258,
260 (1934). Although a de facto officer cannot require the governmental body to
compensate him, he can retain, as against the governmentl body, compensation paid
to him. McKenna v. Nichols, 295 Ky. 778, 175 S.W.2d 121, 122-23 (1943)-
"'See note 9 supra.
2nSee note 23 supra.
2nSee note 26 supra.
